Constraints and incentives for making long horizon corporate investments
Constraints and incentives for making long horizon corporate investments
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DOI：
10.1002/smj.862
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发表时间：
2010-12
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
David Souder;J. Shaver
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
David Souder;J. Shaver
本文考察了企业进行长期投资（即需要很长时间才能获得回报的投资）的条件。我们预测，当短期业绩不佳时，公司会受到限制，不愿进行长期投资——这种影响对年轻公司尤其明显。此外，我们认为，当管理者持有高水平的可执行股票期权时，他们的公司不太可能进行长期投资。然而，当管理层的股票期权尚未行使时，公司更有可能追求长期投资。通过对1972-1996年有线电视运营商投资情况的分析，我们发现这些预测是正确的。除了增强我们对投资选择的理解之外，这些结果——来自于对投资收益水平的临时集中分析——表明收益水平本身就是一个重要的投资属性，应该与投资的其他方面（如预期回报和风险）区分开来。版权所有©2010 John Wiley & Sons， Ltd
This paper examines the conditions under which firms make long horizon investments (i.e., investments that take a long period of time to pay off). We predict firms are constrained from making long horizon investments when short‐term performance is poor—and this effect is especially pronounced for young firms. Moreover, we argue that when managers hold high levels of exercisable stock options, their firms are less likely to make long‐term investments. However, firms are more likely to pursue long horizon investments when managerial stock options are not yet exercisable. Based on analysis of investments made by cable television operators from 1972–1996, we find support for these predictions. In addition to enhancing our understanding of investment choices, these results—derived from the temporally focused analysis of an investment's payoff horizon—suggest that payoff horizon is an important investment attribute in its own right and should be analyzed distinctly from and in addition to other aspects of investments, such as expected return and risk. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.