HaPPY-Mine: Designing a Mining RewardFunction
HaPPY-Mine: Designing a Mining RewardFunction
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HaPPY-Mine：设计挖矿奖励函数
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-662-64331-0_13
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kiffer, Lucianna and
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kiffer, Lucianna and
在加密货币中，区块奖励旨在作为矿工投入资源创建区块并实际上保护系统的激励机制。现有系统主要按消耗资源的比例分配奖励，并遵循总区块奖励的两个静态模型之一：（i）每个区块的固定奖励（例如以太坊），或（ii）区块奖励每设定数量的区块减半（例如，大约每 4 年减半的比特币模型），但在减半之间保持固定。在最近的工作中，对不对称矿工成本下的静态模型进行博弈论分析表明，均衡始终存在且是唯一的[4]。他们的分析还揭示了不对称成本如何导致区块链挖矿的大规模中心化，这种现象在比特币和以太坊中已经观察到，并在包括[11, 16]在内的其他研究中得到了强调。在这项工作中，我们引入了一系列新颖的挖矿奖励函数，HaPPY-Mine（HAsh-Pegged Proportional Yield），它将奖励的价值与系统的哈希率挂钩，随着哈希率的增加而减少奖励。HaPPY-Mine按比例分配奖励扩展了算力并继承了[9]中建立的广义比例奖励函数的安全属性。我们在异构矿工成本模型下研究 HaPPY-Mine，结果表明，一组独特的矿工参与者和独特的总算力始终存在均衡。值得注意的是，我们证明了 aHaPPY-Minee 均衡在一组指标（包括挖矿参与者数量和算力分布）下比静态模型均衡更加去中心化。最后，我们证明任何 HaPPY-Minee 均衡对于共谋和女巫攻击也是安全的，并探讨了货币的市场价值如何影响均衡。
In cryptocurrencies, the block reward is meant to serve as the incentive mechanism for miners to commit resources to create blocks and in effect secure the system. Existing systems primarily divide the reward in proportion to expended resources and follow one of two static models for total block reward: (i) a fixed reward for each block (e.g., Ethereum), or (ii) one where the block reward halves every set number of blocks (e.g., the Bitcoin model of halving roughly every 4 years) but otherwise remains fixed between halvings. In recent work, a game-theoretic analysis of the static model under asymmetric miner costs showed that an equilibrium always exists and is unique [4]. Their analysis also reveals how asymmetric costs can lead to large-scale centralization in blockchain mining, a phenomenon that has been observed in Bitcoin and Ethereum and highlighted by other studies including [11, 16].In this work we introduce a novel family of mining reward functions,HaPPY-Mine(HAsh-Pegged Proportional Yield), which peg the value of the reward to the hashrate of the system, decreasing the reward as the hashrate increases.HaPPY-Minedistributes rewards in proportion to expended hashrate and inherits the safety properties of the generalized proportional reward function established in [9]. We studyHaPPY-Mineunder a heterogeneous miner cost model and show that an equilibrium always exists with a unique set of miner participants and a unique total hashrate. Significantly, we prove that aHaPPY-Mineequilibrium is more decentralized than the static model equilibrium under a set of metrics including number of mining participants and hashrate distribution. Finally, we show that anyHaPPY-Mineequilibriumis also safe against collusion and sybil attacks, and explore how the market value of the currency affects the equilibrium.