Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk
Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk
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信息不对称与最不发达国家借款的主权风险
DOI：
10.2307/2232351
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发表时间：
1984
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kenneth M. Kletzer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kenneth M. Kletzer
1973年以来，向欠发达国家提供私人贷款的数量和范围急剧增加，引起了广泛关注。在当前经济衰退期间，西方媒体经常报道债权人不知道向个别最不发达国家提供的贷款总额，从而错误地评估了违约风险。本文提出了一个具有主权风险的国际贷款理论模型，强调债权人和债务人之间总偿债义务信息不对称的作用。该模型用于解释主权风险如何导致最不发达国家借款中观察到的重要特征。最近的几项研究对最不发达国家在国际资本市场上的借贷特征进行了调查和描述（例如，参见 Eaton 和 Gersovitz (I98I b)；Fleming (I98I)；Hope (I98I)；IMF (I98I 和 I980)；O'Brien (1 98 I) 和 Wellens (I 977)）。 Eaton 和 Gersovitz (1 98 I b) 特别认为，主权国家可能拒绝偿还债务的威胁是导致最不发达国家借款的市场结果与发达国家之间借贷和国内企业融资中观察到的贷款合同性质之间显着差异的原因。欧洲债券市场上获得长期贷款的机会仅限于极少数非欧佩克最不发达国家，而大多数在私人信贷市场上获得贷款的最不发达国家从美国和欧洲主要银行获得中期商业信贷。因此，最不发达国家债务的期限通常比大多数发达国家的公司债务要短。收入最低的最不发达国家几乎从未进入私人贷款市场，只能依赖官方债权人和国际机构的长期借款。据报道，私人债权人还分析各个国家的信用度，即它们吸收资本流入和偿还债务的能力或倾向。因此，最不发达国家政府经常采取旨在表明信用度的政策。国际市场上的信贷通常是数量配给的，储蓄率和投资率较高的国家以较低的利率获得较大的贷款。由于贷款人往往无法在债务人的政治管辖范围内就违约行为获得法律补救，因此国内公司债券融资中常见的互利合同在国际信贷市场上无法执行。在存在主权风险的情况下，贷款人必须依靠未来信贷被拒绝的威胁以及债务人商品贸易或贸易融资渠道的中断来阻止赖账。就公司融资而言，债券契约和破产条款可保护债权人免受后续借款造成的违约风险增加的影响
The dramatic rise in the amount and extent of private lending to the lessdeveloped countries following I973 has received widespread attention. During the current recession, the Western press has often reported that creditors were unaware of the total amount of lending to individual LDCs, thereby incorrectly assessing the risk of default. This paper presents a theoretical model of international lending with sovereign risk which emphasises the role of asymmetric information about total debt-service obligations between creditors and debtors. The model is used to explain how sovereign risk leads to important special features observed in LDC borrowing. The characteristics of borrowing by the LDCs on international capital markets have been investigated and described in several recent studies (see, for example, Eaton and Gersovitz (I98I b); Fleming (I98I); Hope (I98I); IMF (I98I and I980); O'Brien (1 98 I) and Wellens (I 977)). Eaton and Gersovitz (1 98 I b), in particular, argue that the threat of possible repudiation of debt by a sovereign country is responsible for the salient differences between market outcomes for LDC borrowing and the nature of loan contracts observed in lending between developed nations and in domestic corporate finance. Access to long-term loans on the Eurobond market is limited to very few non-OPEC LDCs, and most LDCs which receive loans on the private credit market obtain medium-term commercial credit from the major U.S. and European banks. Therefore, LD C debt is typically of shorter maturity than most developed country corporate debt. The lowest income LDCs almost never gain access to the private loan market and rely upon long-term borrowing from official creditors and international agencies. Private creditors are also reported to analyse individual countries' credit-worthiness, that is, their ability, or proclivity, to absorb capital inflows and repay debts. Therefore, the adoption of policies intended to signal credit-worthiness by LDC governments is often observed. Credit on international markets is typically quantity-rationed, with countries having higher rates of saving and investment receiving larger loans at lower rates of interest. Because lenders are often unable to obtain legal remedies for breach of contract in a debtor's political jurisdiction, mutually advantageous contracts common in domestic corporate bond-finance are unenforceable in the international credit market. In the presence of sovereign risk, lenders must rely upon the threatened denial of future credits and the disruption of a debtor's commodity trade or access to trade-finance to discourage the repudiation of debt. In the case of corporate finance, bond convenants and bankruptcy provisions protect creditors from increases in their exposure to default risk created by subsequent borrowing