Austerity
Austerity
复制标题
紧缩
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2532855
复制
发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Dirk Niepelt
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Harris Dellas;Dirk Niepelt
本文研究了具有私人信息的主权国家的最优债务和投资决策。分离均衡的特征是对经常账户设置上限。主权国家偿还超过违约成本的到期债务，以表明其信誉和平稳的消费。接受以投资/改革为条件的供资放松了借贷限制，即使投资并不创造抵押品，但它抑制了当前的消费。该模型包含债权人在希腊紧缩计划中强调的信号元素，并与2015年大选后希腊发放的贷款及其利率的减少相一致。
We study the optimal debt and investment decisions of a sovereign with private information. The separating equilibrium is characterised by a cap on the current account. A sovereign repays debt amount due that exceeds default costs in order to signal creditworthiness and smooth consumption. Accepting funding conditional on investment/reforms relaxes borrowing constraints, even when investment does not create collateral, but it depresses current consumption. The model contains the signalling elements emphasised by creditors in the Greek austerity programmes and is consistent with the reduction in the loans issued by Greece and their interest rate following the 2015 election.