Bridging Ranking Theory and the Stability Theory of Belief
Bridging Ranking Theory and the Stability Theory of Belief
复制标题
桥接排名理论和信念稳定性理论
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Niels Skovgaard
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Eric Raidl;Niels Skovgaard
在本文中，我们比较了Leitgeb的信念稳定性理论（Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 164:1338-1389, 2013; The Philosophical Review, 123:131-171, [2014]）和Spohn的信念排名理论解释（Spohn, 1988, 2012）。我们讨论这两种理论作为彩票悖论的解决方案。为了比较这两种理论，我们引入了排序（质量）函数和概率（质量）函数之间的新颖翻译。我们从这个翻译中得出了一些重要的结论，特别是一个新的概率信念概念。在此基础上，我们探讨了两种信念理论之间的逻辑关系，表明莱特格布理论的模型与斯波恩理论的某些模型相对应。反之则不然（或者仅在翻译参数的特殊约束下成立）。最后，我们讨论这些结果如何提出信念理论中的新问题。特别是，我们提出了这样的问题：稳定性（莱特格布理论的关键要素）是否被正确地视为与信仰（而不是知识）有关的属性。
In this paper we compare Leitgeb’s stability theory of belief (Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 164:1338-1389, 2013; The Philosophical Review, 123:131-171, [2014]) and Spohn’s ranking-theoretic account of belief (Spohn, 1988, 2012). We discuss the two theories as solutions to the lottery paradox. To compare the two theories, we introduce a novel translation between ranking (mass) functions and probability (mass) functions. We draw some crucial consequences from this translation, in particular a new probabilistic belief notion. Based on this, we explore the logical relation between the two belief theories, showing that models of Leitgeb’s theory correspond to certain models of Spohn’s theory. The reverse is not true (or holds only under special constraints on the parameter of the translation). Finally, we discuss how these results raise new questions in belief theory. In particular, we raise the question whether stability (a key ingredient of Leitgeb’s theory) is rightly thought of as a property pertaining to belief (rather than to knowledge).