Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor Relations Decisions, 1949-1988
Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor Relations Decisions, 1949-1988
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国会控制还是司法独立：美国最高法院劳资关系判决的决定因素，1949-1988 年
DOI：
10.2307/2555900
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发表时间：
1992
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Rafael Gely
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Spiller;Rafael Gely
本文将谢泼尔和温加斯特提出的方法扩展到国会和监管机构，介绍了一个意识形态驱动的司法机构。该模型产生了经验上可反驳的影响，然后在对法院关于劳资关系的决定进行建模的框架中进行了测试。利用政治家的《美国残疾人法》得分、最高法院的组成和最高法院的判决等信息，我们获得了以下方面的估计：(a)最高法院相对于国会相关议员的地位，以及(b)多年来劳工政策的决定因素。我们发现，首先，法院在至少一半的时间里受到国会的限制。其次，国会相关议员对《美国残疾人法》的评价每提高10个百分点，或最高法院对《美国残疾人法》的估计评价每提高10个百分点，就会使支持工会的决定的可能性提高约8个百分点。第三，法院的政治倾向似乎可以简单地通过其政治组成得到很好的解释。第四，最高法院似乎并不听从NLRB的意见。最后，尽管我们的模型很简洁，但它相对较好地预测了最高法院的判决，优于没有制度内容的简单政治讨价还价模型，也优于不复杂或纯粹法律主义的司法决策模型。因此，我们的结果表明，法院对利益集团的压力作出了反应，尽管是间接的。
Extending the approach to congressional and regulatory institutions developed by Shepsle and Weingast, this article introduces an ideologically motivated judiciary. The model yields empirically refutable implications which are then tested in the framework of modelling the Court's decisions on industrial labor relations. Using information on politicians' ADA scores, the composition of the Court, and the decisions of the Court, we obtain estimates of (a) the position of the Court in relation to the relevant members of Congress, and (b) the determinants of labor policy through the years. We find, first, that the Court was constrained by Congress over at least half of the period. Second, a 10-point increase in the ADA rating of the relevant member of Congress, or in the imputed ADA rating of the Supreme Court, increases the probability of a pro-union decision by approximately eight percentage points. Third, the imputed political preferences of the Court seem to be well explained simply by its political composition. Fourth, the Court does not seem to defer to the NLRB. Finally, though parsimonious, our model is a relatively good predictor of the Court's decisions, and superior to both a simple political bargaining model without institutional content and a nonsophisticated or purely legalistic judicial decision-making model. Our results, then, suggest that the Court responds, albeit indirectly, to interest group pressures.