Remarks on the logic of imagination. A step towards understanding doxastic control through imagination
Remarks on the logic of imagination. A step towards understanding doxastic control through imagination
复制标题
关于想象逻辑的评论。
DOI：
10.1007/s11229-015-0945-4
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
H. Wansing
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Wansing
想象力最近引起了认识论者的极大关注，并被认为是信仰甚至知识的源泉。想象力的一个显着特征是，它通常且典型地具有主体性：主体决定想象。在想象产生信念的情况下，想象的能动性可能被认为会产生间接的信念控制和认知责任。这一观察要求正确理解主体想象力。特别是，它要求发展想象归属的语义。在本文中，考虑了 Ilkka Niiniluoto 早期关于想象逻辑的建议。该提议没有抓住想象的主体本质，并且提出了替代语义。新语义将代理模态逻辑与道德模态逻辑的邻域语义相结合。
Imagination has recently attracted considerable attention from epistemologists and is recognized as a source of belief and even knowledge. One remarkable feature of imagination is that it is often and typically agentive: agents decide to imagine. In cases in which imagination results in a belief, the agentiveness of imagination may be taken to give rise to indirect doxastic control and epistemic responsibility. This observation calls for a proper understanding of agentive imagination. In particular, it calls for the development of a semantics of imagination ascriptions. In the present paper an earlier suggestion by Ilkka Niiniluoto for a logic of imagination is considered. This proposal does not capture the agentive nature of imagination, and an alternative semantics is suggested. The new semantics combines the modal logic of agency with the neighbourhood semantics from alethic modal logic.