Conformity-driven agents support ordered phases in the spatial public goods game
Conformity-driven agents support ordered phases in the spatial public goods game
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DOI：
10.1209/0295-5075/114/38001
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发表时间：
2016-05-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
Caravelli, Francesco
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Javarone, Marco Alberto;Antonioni, Alberto;Caravelli, Francesco
我们研究了存在健身驱动和一致性驱动的代理人的空间公共产品博弈。这个框架通常只考虑前一种类型的代理，即，倾向于模仿最合适的邻居的策略的代理。然而，每当我们研究社会系统时，人口的进化也可能受到社会行为的影响，如顺从，利他主义，自私。虽然术语演化可以根据所考虑的领域而具有不同的含义，但在这里，它对应于将系统引向平衡或稳态的一系列过程。我们映射健身代理的回报，使更丰富的代理是那些最模仿的健身驱动的代理，而一致性驱动的代理往往模仿的策略，他们的大多数邻居。数值模拟的目的是确定过渡的性质，在人口中的一致性驱动的代理商的相对密度的变化量，并研究相关的平衡的性质。值得注意的是，我们发现，顺从通常会促进有序的合作阶段，也可能会导致不合作的行为。版权所有（C）2016 EPLA
We investigate the spatial Public Goods Game in the presence of fitness-driven and conformity-driven agents. This framework usually considers only the former type of agents, i.e., agents that tend to imitate the strategy of their fittest neighbors. However, whenever we study social systems, the evolution of a population might be affected also by social behaviors as conformism, stubbornness, altruism, and selfishness. Although the term evolution can assume different meanings depending on the considered domain, here it corresponds to the set of processes that lead a system towards an equilibrium or a steady state. We map fitness to the agents' payoff so that richer agents are those most imitated by fitness-driven agents, while conformity-driven agents tend to imitate the strategy assumed by the majority of their neighbors. Numerical simulations aim to identify the nature of the transition, on varying the amount of the relative density of conformity-driven agents in the population, and to study the nature of related equilibria. Remarkably, we find that conformism generally fosters ordered cooperative phases and may also lead to bistable behaviors. Copyright (C) EPLA, 2016