A New Theory of Congressional Compromise
A New Theory of Congressional Compromise
复制标题
国会妥协的新理论
DOI：
--
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发表时间：
1983
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
James M. Enelow
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
James M. Enelow
一种新的国会妥协模式被构建，在这种模式中，领导层面对前景不确定的法案，被迫妥协。领导层有自己的政策偏好，并寻求将预期损失最小化的妥协。假设每个结果的概率的一个合理的表达式，并基于两个简单的参数导出最优折衷的形式。这些解决方案非常具有启发性，并支持在广泛的条件下接近50-50分裂的妥协预期。
A new model of congressional compromise is constructed in which leadership, faced with a bill whose prospects are uncertain, is forced to compromise. Leadership has policy preferences of its own and seeks a compromise that will minimize its expected loss. A reasonable expression for the probability of each outcome is assumed, and the form of the optimal compromise is derived based on two simple parameters. The solutions are quite revealing and support the expectation of compromises close to a 50-50 split under a broad range of conditions.