Diversification and reconfiguration of party systems in postindustrial democracies
Diversification and reconfiguration of party systems in postindustrial democracies
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后工业民主国家政党制度的多元化和重组
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
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通讯作者：
Herbert P. Kitschelt
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作者：
Herbert P. Kitschelt
关于先进资本主义社会和政治变化的兰德理论，如丹尼尔·贝尔或阿兰·图兰在20世纪60年代最初提出的理论，预测了从工业社会向后工业社会转型过程中政治利益的结盟和政治参与的重要性将发生巨大变化，这是正确的。当然，由于40年的技术创新、经济增长和政治斗争提供的后见之明，他们最初愿景的许多细节已经变得不可信。然而，有两个预测经得起时间的考验。首先，我们确实观察到了在马克思主义二元阶级框架中构思的阶级政治的终结，尽管不是后工业资本主义政治中分配冲突的终结。其次，正如贝尔特别是图雷恩所预测的那样，政治不再只是关于谁得到什么、何时以及如何的分配安排，而是关于社会组织的治理结构和文化生活方式。后工业政治确实充满了关于个人和群体行为的控制、拥有什么样的监管权力的当局有权决定个人的生活方式以及公民如何行使参与具有约束力的集体决策的能力和权利的冲突。所有这些都导致了传统政党制度的重新配置，如果不是崩溃的话，肯定是因为老牌政党必须重新定义它们的纲领诉求，而且往往是因为新的党派标签在选举竞争中的成功出现。在这个过程中，面向“工人阶级”利益的政党消失了。在理论层面上，将人口按等级划分为蓝领劳动阶层和白领中间阶层的传统社会结构概念已经失去了对政治动员研究的分析意义。然而，政党并没有像法兰克福学派所设想的那样成为忧郁的、受法兰克福学派影响的对多元化民主的批评(Kirchheimer 1965)所指的“包罗万象”的政党，而是表达、制定并加剧了与经济分配和政治文化治理结构有关的新的问题路线分歧，这些分歧需要准确的分析定性和解释。与此同时，政治参与已经大大超出了政党主导的领域。推动政党制度重新配置的同一套社会和政治机制也促进了政治行动模式的分化。在接下来的几页中，我试图为这种直截了当的断言提供一些粗略的理由。我首先从社会学的观点出发，认为后工业社会的政治偏好形成是当前政治过程和政策形成的外生，但内生于过去政治决定的累积结果，这里主要是福利国家的发展。基于这种外在构成的显著偏好分布空间，我接着讨论了不同标签下的广告方可能面临的战略规划选择，这取决于他们在个别政治中遇到的竞争对手的配置。第三部分概述了为什么我认为，将当前后工业化政党制度的转型描述为政治代理人与他们的委托人、选举选区脱钩是无益的。我在我对Katz和Mair(1995)有影响力并经常被引用的关于“卡特尔政党”崛起的文章(Kitschelt 2000a)的评论中谈到了这个问题。我要在这里指出，如果说有什么不同的话，那就是近几十年来政党对公民要求的响应程度有所提高，这可以从发达资本主义民主国家中裙带主义公民与政治家联系的衰落中推断出来，我以前也谈过这个话题(Kitschelt 2000b；2002；2003b)。事实上，我们有证据表明，即使在最近的“全球化”时代，党派反应仍在继续影响政策制定。我在第四节中提供了一个不完整的文献回顾来说明这一点。在最后一节，我简要地谈一谈政治行动模式的区别问题。
rand theories of social and political change in advanced capitalism, such as those originally proposed by Daniel Bell or Alain Touraine in the 1960s, were right in predicting a sea change in the alignment of political interests and the pra ctices of political participation in the transition from industrial to postindustrial societies. With the benefit of hindsight provided by another forty years of technological innovation, economic growth, and political battle, of course, many details of their original visions have become implausible. Nevertheless, two predictions stand up to the test of time. First, we do observe the end of class politics, conceived in a Marxist binary class framework, though not the end of distributive conflict in the politics of postindustrial capita lism. Second, as predicted by Bell and especially Touraine, politics is no longer just about distributive arrangements of who gets what when and how, but also about the governance structures of social organization and cultural life styles. Postindustrial politics is indeed shot through with conflict about the control of individual and group conduct what sort of authorities with what kind of regulatory powers are entitled to determine individuals’ life styles and how citizens can exercise capacities and rights to participate in binding collective decisions. All this has contributed to a reconfiguration, if not a crumbling of traditional party systems certainly in the sense that established parties had to redefine their programmatic appeals and often enough with the successful appearance of new partisan labels in the electoral competition. In this process, parties geared to the interests of the “working class” have vanished. On the theoretical plane, conventional conceptions of social structure dividing the population hierarchically into a manual blue-collar working class and a white collar middle stratum have lost their analytical significance for the study of political mobilization. Political parties, however, have not become “catch-all” parties in the sense a melancholic, Frankfurt School influenced critique of pluralist democracy envisioned (Kirchheimer 1965), but express, enact, and exacerbate new lines of issue divides concerned with economic distribution and political-cultural governance structures that call for precise analytical characterization and explanation. At the same time, political participation has vastly expanded beyond the realm of the party-dominated domain. The same set of societal and political mechanisms that drive the reconfiguration of the party systems has also promoted the differentiation of modes of political action. On the following pages, I try to offer some sketchy justifications for this barrage of bald assertions. I begin with a sociological view of political preference formation in postindustrial society as exogenous to the current political process and policy formation, but endogenous to the cumulative consequences of past political decisions, and here primarily the development of welfare states. Based on this exogenously constituted space of salient preference distributions, I then discuss the strategic programmatic options parties advertising under different labels may face contingent upon the configuration of competitors they encounter in individual polities. The third section outlines why I believe that it is unhelpful to characterize the current transformation of postindustrial party systems as a decoupling of the political agents from their principals, electoral constituencies. I addressed this subject in my critique of Katz and Mair’s (1995) influential and often cited article on the rise of “cartel parties” (Kitschelt 2000a). I will argue here that, if anything, the responsiveness of political parties to citizens’ demands has increased in recent decades, as can be inferred from the decline of clientelistic citizen-politician linkages in advanced capitalist democracies, a topic I have also dealt with before (Kitschelt 2000b; 2002; 2003b). In fact, we have evidence that even in the recent era of “globa lization” partisan responsiveness continues to affect policy making. I provide an incomplete literature review to illustrate this point in section four. In the final section, I briefly dwell on the issue of differentiation of political modes of action.