Debt covenants in Japanese loan markets: in comparison with the traditional relationship banking
Debt covenants in Japanese loan markets: in comparison with the traditional relationship banking
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日本贷款市场的债务契约：与传统关系银行业务的比较
DOI：
10.1111/acfi.12568
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Ryosuke Nakamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Takuma Kochiyama;Ryosuke Nakamura
本研究探讨日本贷款市场中债务契约的决定因素。我们关注日本银行独特的监督机制，并假设债务契约取代了传统的主银行治理。同样，我们发现，债务契约不太可能被用于与其主要银行有较强联系的公司。我们还证明了债务契约的使用会导致借款人向上的盈余管理。总的来说，我们的证据表明，在日本的背景下，债务契约被用作主银行系统的替代品，但它们本身是一个不完整的监督机制。
This study investigates determinants of debt covenants in Japanese loan markets. We focus on a unique monitoring mechanism by Japanese banks and hypothesise that debt covenants substitute for the traditional main bank governance. Consistently, we find that debt covenants are less likely to be used for firms with stronger ties with their main banks. We also document that such use of debt covenants results in borrower’s upward earnings management. Overall, our evidence suggests that, in the Japanese context, debt covenants are used as a substitute for the main bank system yet they alone are an incomplete monitoring mechanism.