An Efficient Dynamic Allocation Mechanism for Security in Networks of Interdependent Strategic Agents
An Efficient Dynamic Allocation Mechanism for Security in Networks of Interdependent Strategic Agents
复制标题
相互依存的战略主体网络安全的高效动态分配机制
DOI：
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
S. J. Golestani
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Farhadi;F. Farhadi;Hamidreza Tavafoghi;Hamidreza Tavafoghi;D. Teneketzis;S. J. Golestani
基于网络安全问题，研究了多智能体网络系统中动态资源分配的激励机制设计问题。每个策略代理都有一个私有的安全状态，它可以是安全的，也可以是不安全的，并且只有他自己知道。在任何时候，每个代理都面临来自外部以及来自不安全邻居的安全威胁。因此，代理人的状态是相关的，并具有相互依赖的随机动态。代理具有相互依赖的估值，因为每个代理的瞬时效用取决于他自己的安全状态以及他邻居的安全状态。有一个网络管理器，可以分配一个安全资源，在每一个时间，以保护网络免受攻击，并最大限度地提高整体社会福利。我们提出了一个动态的激励机制，实现了有效的配置，是事前（在预期）的个人理性和预算平衡。我们提出了一个基于声誉的支付，减轻任何风险，代理或网络管理员可能面临的获得负效用或运行预算赤字，分别为一些实现的网络随机演化。因此，我们的研究结果提供了一个动态的激励机制，实现有效的分配在网络系统中的战略代理，具有相关的类型和相互依赖的估值，是近似的事后个人理性和预算平衡。
Motivated by security issues in networks, we study the problem of incentive mechanism design for dynamic resource allocation in a multi-agent networked system. Each strategic agent has a private security state which can be safe or unsafe and is only known to him. At every time, each agent faces security threats from outside as well as from his unsafe neighbors. Therefore, the agents’ states are correlated and have interdependent stochastic dynamics. Agents have interdependent valuations, as each agent’s instantaneous utility depends on his own security state as well as his neighbors’ security states. There is a network manager that can allocate a security resource to one agent at each time so as to protect the network against attacks and maximize the overall social welfare. We propose a dynamic incentive mechanism that implements the efficient allocation and is ex-ante (in expectation) individually rational and budget balanced. We present a reputation-based payment that mitigates any risk that the agents or the network manager may face to get a negative utility or to run a budget deficit, respectively, for some realizations of the network stochastic evolution. Therefore, our results provide a dynamic incentive mechanism that implements efficient allocations in networked systems with strategic agents that have correlated types and interdependent valuations, and is approximate ex-post individually rational and budget balanced.