TAX ME IF YOU CAN! OPTIMAL NONLINEAR INCOME TAX BETWEEN COMPETING GOVERNMENTS
TAX ME IF YOU CAN! OPTIMAL NONLINEAR INCOME TAX BETWEEN COMPETING GOVERNMENTS
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DOI：
10.1093/qje/qju027
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发表时间：
2014-11-01
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
Trannoy, Alain
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Lehmann, Etienne;Simula, Laurent;Trannoy, Alain
我们研究了当两个国家玩纳什游戏时，潜在的税收驱动的移民如何改变 Mirrlees 所得税表。社会目标是最大化，偏好在消费中是准线性的。每个人的技能和迁移成本都存在差异，并且是连续分布的。我们推导出均衡状态下的最优边际所得税率，扩展了 Diamond-Saez 公式。我们表明，移民半弹性的水平和斜率（我们缺乏经验证据）对于推导出最优边际所得税的形状至关重要。
We investigate how potential tax-driven migrations modify the Mirrlees income tax schedule when two countries play Nash. The social objective is the maximin and preferences are quasi-linear in consumption. Individuals differ both in skills and migration costs, which are continuously distributed. We derive the optimal marginal income tax rates at the equilibrium, extending the Diamond-Saez formula. We show that the level and the slope of the semi-elasticity of migration (on which we lack empirical evidence) are crucial to derive the shape of optimal marginal income tax.