The Political Economy of Banking Regulation, 1864–1933

The Political Economy of Banking Regulation, 1864–1933
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银行监管的政治经济学,1864-1933

DOI:
10.1017/s002205070002684x
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发表时间:
1982
期刊:
The Journal of Economic History
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
E. White
E. White
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
E. White

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从南北战争到大萧条时期,塑造银行业结构的法律法规受到银行界的强烈影响。在此期间,由于州和联邦监管机构试图增加银行系统成员数量的竞争,对银行的法律的约束被削弱。然而,监管的取消并没有完成,因为该行业中政治上最强大的集团,即单位银行,有兴趣保留一些监管。
The laws and regulations that shaped the structure of the banking industry from the Civil War to the Great Depression were strongly influenced by the banking community. In this period legal constraints on banks were weakened by competition between state and federal regulators trying to increase membership in their banking systems. The elimination of regulation was not completed, however, because the politically most powerful group in the industry, the unit banks, had an interest in preserving some regulations.