Truthmaking, metaethics, and creeping minimalism
Truthmaking, metaethics, and creeping minimalism
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讲真话、元伦理学和渐行渐远的极简主义
DOI：
10.1007/s11098-011-9808-0
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Jamin Asay
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jamin Asay
蠕动的极简主义威胁着现实主义和反现实主义的元伦理观点之间的区别。当反实在论的观点装备自己的真理和其他语义概念的最低限度的理论，他们能够采取越来越多的现实主义的学说（如道德真理，事实和信仰的存在）。但随后，它们开始看起来可疑地像现实主义观点。我认为，只有当道德现实主义主要被理解为一种语义学说时，爬行的极简主义才是一个问题。我认为，道德现实主义更好地理解，而不是作为一个形而上学的学说。因此，我们可以有效地将元伦理学的辩论整合为一个关于道德真理制造者的辩论：凭借什么道德判断是真实的？我展示了真相创造的概念是如何在元伦理辩论的表面下酝酿的，以及它如何揭示一种元伦理观点（准现实主义）是比其他观点更强的竞争者。
Creeping minimalism threatens to cloud the distinction between realist and anti-realist metaethical views. When anti-realist views equip themselves with minimalist theories of truth and other semantic notions, they are able to take on more and more of the doctrines of realism (such as the existence of moral truths, facts, and beliefs). But then they start to look suspiciously like realist views. I suggest that creeping minimalism is a problem only if moral realism is understood primarily as a semantic doctrine. I argue that moral realism is better understood instead as a metaphysical doctrine. As a result, we can usefully regiment the metaethical debate into one about moral truthmakers: In virtue of what are moral judgments true? I show how the notion of truthmaking has been simmering just below the surface of the metaethical debate, and how it reveals one metaethical view (quasi-realism) to be a stronger contender than the others.