The impact of bank ownership concentration on impaired loans and capital adequacy
The impact of bank ownership concentration on impaired loans and capital adequacy
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.08.007
复制
发表时间：
2010-02
影响因子：
3.7
通讯作者：
C. T. Shehzad;J. Haan;Bert Scholtens
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. T. Shehzad;J. Haan;Bert Scholtens
本文考察了银行股权集中度对银行不良贷款和资本充足率这两个银行风险指标的影响。利用来自50多个国家的约500家商业银行2005-2007年的平均资产负债表信息，我们发现，集中的所有权（由不同程度的股权代表）显着降低了银行的不良贷款率，条件是监督控制和股东保护权。此外，股权集中度对资本充足率的影响是正向的，但必须以股东保护为前提。在股东保护权和监督权水平较低的情况下，股权集中度降低了银行风险。
This paper examines the impact of bank ownership concentration on two indicators of bank riskiness, namely banks’ non-performing loans and capital adequacy. Using balance sheet information for around 500 commercial banks from more than 50 countries averaged over 2005–2007, we find that concentrated ownership (proxied by different levels of shareholding) significantly reduces a bank’s non-performing loans ratio, conditional on supervisory control and shareholders protection rights. Furthermore, ownership concentration affects the capital adequacy ratio positively conditional on shareholder protection. At low levels of shareholder protection rights and supervisory control, ownership concentration reduces bank riskiness.