Deontological and Utilitarian Inclinations in Moral Decision Making: A Process Dissociation Approach
Deontological and Utilitarian Inclinations in Moral Decision Making: A Process Dissociation Approach
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DOI：
10.1037/a0031021
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发表时间：
2013-02-01
影响因子：
7.6
通讯作者：
Gawronski, Bertram
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Conway, Paul;Gawronski, Bertram
道德判断的双过程理论表明，对道德困境的反应是由两个道德原则指导的：义务论原则指出，行为的道德性取决于行为的内在性质（例如，伤害他人是错误的，不管其后果如何）;功利主义的原则意味着行为的道德由其后果决定（例如，伤害他人是可以接受的，如果它增加了更多人的福祉）。尽管提出了反映这些原则的道德倾向的独立性，以前的工作依赖于操作化，其中一种较强的倾向意味着另一种较弱的倾向。目前的研究应用了Alberby（1991）的过程分离程序来独立地量化个体内的义务论和功利主义倾向的强度。研究1证实了有用的过程分离捕捉个体差异的义务和功利主义倾向，揭示了正相关的两种倾向的道德身份。此外，义务论倾向与共情关注、观点采择和宗教信仰有着独特的联系，而功利主义倾向则与认知需求有着独特的联系。研究2表明，认知负荷选择性地减少功利主义倾向，与义务倾向不受影响。在研究3中，旨在增强共情的操纵增加了义务论倾向，而功利主义倾向不受影响。这些发现为义务论和功利主义倾向对道德判断的独立贡献提供了证据，解决了先前研究所暗示的许多理论模糊性。
Dual-process theories of moral judgment suggest that responses to moral dilemmas are guided by two moral principles: the principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action (e.g., harming others is wrong regardless of its consequences); the principle of utilitarianism implies that the morality of an action is determined by its consequences (e.g., harming others is acceptable if it increases the well-being of a greater number of people). Despite the proposed independence of the moral inclinations reflecting these principles, previous work has relied on operationalizations in which stronger inclinations of one kind imply weaker inclinations of the other kind. The current research applied Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation procedure to independently quantify the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations within individuals. Study 1 confirmed the usefulness of process dissociation for capturing individual differences in deontological and utilitarian inclinations, revealing positive correlations of both inclinations to moral identity. Moreover, deontological inclinations were uniquely related to empathic concern, perspective-taking, and religiosity, whereas utilitarian inclinations were uniquely related to need for cognition. Study 2 demonstrated that cognitive load selectively reduced utilitarian inclinations, with deontological inclinations being unaffected. In Study 3, a manipulation designed to enhance empathy increased deontological inclinations, with utilitarian inclinations being unaffected. These findings provide evidence for the independent contributions of deontological and utilitarian inclinations to moral judgments, resolving many theoretical ambiguities implied by previous research.