Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
复制标题
公共监控不完善的有限重复博弈中的私人策略
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Tadashi Sekiguchi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Mailath;Steven A. Matthews;Tadashi Sekiguchi
我们提出了三个具有公共监控的有限重复博弈的例子，这些博弈在私有策略中具有序列均衡，即依赖于自己过去的行为和公共信号的策略。这种私人序列均衡可能具有与我们更熟悉的完美公共均衡非常不同的特征：(1)使公共信号信息量减少可以产生帕累托优均衡结果；（ii）均衡的末期行动概貌不必是阶段博弈均衡；（iii）即使阶段博弈具有独特的相关均衡（即纳什均衡），第一阶段的行动特征也不一定是阶段博弈均衡。
Abstract We present three examples of finitely repeated games with public monitoring that have sequential equilibria in private strategies, i.e., strategies that depend on own past actions as well as public signals. Such private sequential equilibria can have features quite unlike those of the more familiar perfect public equilibria: (i) making a public signal less informative can create Pareto superior equilibrium outcomes; (ii) the equilibrium final-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium; and (iii) even if the stage game has a unique correlated (and hence Nash) equilibrium, the first-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium.
重新审视重复博弈中的效率：私人策略的作用
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2006
期刊：
Econometrica Vol 74, No.2
影响因子：
--
作者：
M. Kandori;R.Serrano;and O.V;Michihiro Kandori;M. Kandori and I. Obara
通讯作者：
M. Kandori and I. Obara