Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance
Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance
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股东至上与英国公司治理的轨迹
DOI：
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Konzelmann
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Armour;S. Deakin;S. Konzelmann
英国公司治理的核心制度，特别是那些与收购、董事会结构和董事职责有关的制度，强烈地倾向于股东至上的规范。在核心领域之外，特别是在破产法和就业法的交叉领域，由于欧洲共同体的影响，利益攸关方的利益得到了更好的代表。此外，机构股东正在改变其投资战略，不再关注短期回报，而是采取有利于股东的做法。因此，我们认为，英国的制度目前处于不断变化的状态，关于股东至上的辩论还没有结束。
Core institutions of UK corporate governance, in particular those relating to takeovers, board structure and directors’ duties, are strongly orientated towards a norm of shareholder primacy. Beyond the core, in particular at the intersection of insolvency and employment law, stakeholder interests are better represented, thanks to European Community influence. Moreover, institutional shareholders are redirecting their investment strategies away from a focus on short-term returns, in such a way as to favour stakeholder-inclusive practices. We therefore suggest that the UK system is currently in a state of flux and that the debate over shareholder primacy has not been concluded.