Analysis and Interventions in Large Network Games

Analysis and Interventions in Large Network Games
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DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3692826
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发表时间:
2020-09
期刊:
Economics of Networks eJournal
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
F. Parise;A. Ozdaglar
F. Parise;A. Ozdaglar
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
F. Parise;A. Ozdaglar

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We review classic results and recent progress on equilibrium analysis, dynamics, and optimal interventions in network games with both continuous and discrete strategy sets. We study strategic interactions in deterministic networks as well as networks generated from a stochastic network formation model. For the former case, we review a unifying framework for analysis based on the theory of variational inequalities. For the latter case, we highlight how knowledge of the stochastic network formation model can be used by a central planner to design interventions for large networks in a computationally efficient manner when exact network data are not available.