Selection into and across credit contracts: Theory and field research
Selection into and across credit contracts: Theory and field research
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信用合同的选择和跨信用合同的选择：理论和实地研究
DOI：
10.1016/j.jeconom.2005.11.013
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发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
6.3
通讯作者：
R. Townsend
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Christian Ahlin;R. Townsend
贷款人可以选择鼓励借款人使用集体贷款或联合贷款的方式签约，也可以选择不鼓励使用个人贷款的方式签约，以便进行相对绩效比较。在这种情况下，代理人相对于外部人的财富以及潜在连带责任合伙人之间的财富不平等是决定贷款合同选择的重要因素。在是否借贷的相关模型中，较高的回报协方差减轻了逆向选择效应。我们使用在泰国实地研究中收集的相对丰富的数据来测试这些模型。相对于个人合同，连带责任合同的普遍程度与借款家庭的财富呈U形关系，并随着财富分散程度的增加而增加。项目成功的概率越低，连带责任借款的可能性就越大，这是逆向选择的直接肯定。项目间较高的相关性使得连带责任借款相对于所有其他替代方案更有可能。引人注目的是，如果我们不根据模型的指示来调节样本，并在信用合同中进行选择，那么大多数结果都会消失。
Lenders may choose to encourage borrower side contracting using group, or co-signed, loans or discourage it using individual loans, so as to make relative performance comparisons. In this context wealth of the agents relative to outsiders, and wealth inequality among potential joint liability partners, are important factors determining the choice among loan contracts. In a related model of whether to borrow, higher covariance of returns mitigates an adverse selection effect. We test these models using relatively rich data gathered in field research in Thailand. The prevalence of joint liability contracts relative to individual contracts exhibits a U-shaped relationship with the wealth of the borrowing household and increases with the wealth dispersion. The likelihood of joint-liability borrowing increases the lower is the probability of project success, a direct affirmation of adverse selection. Higher correlation across projects makes joint liability borrowing more likely relative to all other alternatives. Strikingly, most of the results disappear if we do not condition the sample according to the dictates of the models, with selection into and across credit contracts.