Party System Institutionalization and Government Formation in new Democracies

Party System Institutionalization and Government Formation in new Democracies
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新民主国家的政党制度制度化和政府组建

DOI:
10.1017/s0043887115000477
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发表时间:
2016
期刊:
影响因子:
5
通讯作者:
Savage L
Savage L
中科院分区:
法学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Savage L

文献摘要

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政党制度提供了联盟谈判环境的基本结构。政党制度的稳定确保了在政府组建中可以观察到的民主的存在,但大多数实证研究都集中在已建立的民主国家。在新兴民主国家,政党制度的制度化程度较低,这意味着政党之间的互动可能是不可预测的,并对联盟的形成产生重大影响。本文介绍了第一个研究联盟的形成,在新的民主国家,采用了经验设计相媲美的领先的研究西欧。作者使用了一个新的数据集的潜在联盟在中欧和东欧,以检查三个解释时,出现的政党制度是弱制度化的政府形成。结果表明,第一,在职是一个不利的政府在新的民主国家时,形成发生在选举后。这一不利因素是由于政策失误和客户主义做法造成的选举波动性很大。在中期组建时,现任者会被淘汰,因为薄弱的政党制度化导致反对党之间的互动模式不成熟,因此无法提供可行的替代方案。第二,以前占主导地位的政党的存在通过抑制纲领性竞争的发展而影响政府的形成。相反,节目竞争屈服于基于历史仇恨的竞争。第三,老牌政党相互勾结,将新政党排除在联合政府之外这可能表明政党制度正在变得更加制度化。本文对政治实践和制度的规范化和稳定化的重要性提出了新的见解。
Party systems provide the essential structure of the coalition bargaining environment. Stability in party systems ensures the presence of regularities that can be observed in government formation, but most empirical research focuses on established democracies. In new democracies, party systems are less institutionalized, which means that interactions between parties can be unpredictable and has significant implications for coalition formation. This article presents the first study of coalition formation in new democracies that employs an empirical design comparable to that of the leading research on Western Europe. The author uses a new data set of potential coalitions in Central and Eastern Europe to examine three explanations for government formation that arise when party systems are weakly institutionalized. The results show first that incumbency is a disadvantage for governments in new democracies when formation occurs postelection. This disadvantage is due to high levels of electoral volatility caused by policy failure and clientelistic practices. Incumbents are advantaged when formation takes place midterm, as weak party system institutionalization leads to an inchoate pattern of interaction between opposition parties, which therefore fail to provide a viable alternative. Second, the presence of former dominant parties influences government formation by stifling the development of programmatic competition. Instead, programmatic competition is subjugated to contestation based on historical enmities. And third, established parties collude to exclude new parties from coalition formation—a possible indicator that a party system is becoming more institutionalized. The article provides new insights into the importance of routinized and stable political practices and institutions.