Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas
Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.03.035
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发表时间：
2014-08-21
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Ohtsuki, Hisashi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Nakamura, Mitsuhiro;Ohtsuki, Hisashi
间接互惠是人类合作进化的关键机制。先前的研究探讨了所谓的捐赠博弈中的间接互惠，这是一类特殊的单边决策的囚徒困境（PD）。更普遍的一类社会困境包括雪堆（SG），猎鹿（SH）和PD游戏，其中两个玩家同时执行行动。在这些错误的博弈中，道德评估需要更加复杂;例如，我们应该如何评估一个名声不好但现在合作的参与者的背叛？我们研究了间接互惠的三个社会困境，并确定了12个成功的社会规范的道德评估。这些成功的规范在不同的困境中有不同的原则来抑制作弊者。为了抑制背叛者，SG和PD禁止任何对好玩家的背叛，而SH允许对好玩家的背叛。为了抑制无条件的合作者，谁帮助任何人，从而间接地有助于危害间接互惠，我们发现了两种机制：对坏球员的行动之间的歧视（在SG和PD中可行）或与坏球员合作的惩罚（在任何社会困境中有效）。此外，我们发现，社会规范，不公平地有利于互惠者增强了合作的鲁棒性在SH，互惠者永远不会失去他们的良好声誉。(C)2014爱思唯尔有限公司版权所有。
Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism for the evolution of human cooperation. Previous studies explored indirect reciprocity in the so-called donation game, a special class of Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) with unilateral decision making. A more general class of social dilemmas includes Snowdrift (SG), Stag Hunt (SH), and PD games, where two players perform actions simultaneously. In these simultaneous-move games, moral assessments need to be more complex; for example, how should we evaluate defection against an ill-reputed, but now cooperative, player? We examined indirect reciprocity in the three social dilemmas and identified twelve successful social norms for moral assessments. These successful norms have different principles in different dilemmas for suppressing cheaters. To suppress defectors, any defection against good players is prohibited in SG and PD, whereas defection against good players may be allowed in SH. To suppress unconditional cooperators, who help anyone and thereby indirectly contribute to jeopardizing indirect reciprocity, we found two mechanisms: indiscrimination between actions toward bad players (feasible in SG and PD) or punishment for cooperation with bad players (effective in any social dilemma). Moreover, we discovered that social norms that unfairly favor reciprocators enhance robustness of cooperation in SH, whereby reciprocators never lose their good reputation. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.