Free Will and Neuroscience: From Explaining Freedom Away to New Ways of Operationalizing and Measuring It
Free Will and Neuroscience: From Explaining Freedom Away to New Ways of Operationalizing and Measuring It
复制标题
自由意志和神经科学：从解释自由到实施和衡量自由的新方法
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
A. Lavazza
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Lavazza
自由意志的概念很难定义，但对个人和社会生活都至关重要。几个世纪以来，人们一直想知道，在一个由物理决定论统治的世界里，自由如何可能实现？然而，直到半个世纪前，对自由意志的思考一直仅限于哲学，当时神经科学也探讨了这个话题。第一个相关且现已广为人知的关于大脑与自由意志相关性的研究是由 Libet 等人开创的。 （1983），重点关注被认为是自由和自愿的决定中发生的据称无意识的意图。 Libet 对所谓的准备潜力（RP）的解释似乎倾向于某种自由紧缩（Soon 等，2008）。然而，最近的研究似乎对 RP 提出了不同的解释，即主观自发随意运动 (SVM) 之前大脑活动的明显积累可能反映了背景神经元噪声的潮起潮落，而背景神经元噪声是由许多因素触发的 (Schurger et al., 2016)。这种解释似乎弥合了自由意志的神经科学观点与直觉、常识性观点之间的差距（Roskies，2010b），但许多问题仍有待解决，并且可以假设其他理论路径。因此，本文建议从可操作的自由意志概念（Lavazza 和 Inglese，2015）开始，寻找高阶描述（对实际生活有用）和神经基础之间的联系。这种概念化自由意志的新方法应该与“能力”的概念联系起来：也就是说，可以在没有意识控制的情况下表现和使用一系列通用技能。能力指数还能够考虑决策的时间尺度差异，包括原因响应性，与内部控制相关，可以理解为代理人对触发相关行为的机制的所有权。一个人拥有能力所需的认知能力可能首先被操作为一套神经心理学测试，它可用于操作和测量特定的执行功能，因为它们与控制的概念密切相关。随后，自由意志指数将允许搜索人们表现出的能力和每个人表现出的能力限制的潜在神经关联。
The concept of free will is hard to define, but crucial to both individual and social life. For centuries people have wondered how freedom is possible in a world ruled by physical determinism; however, reflections on free will have been confined to philosophy until half a century ago, when the topic was also addressed by neuroscience. The first relevant, and now well-known, strand of research on the brain correlates of free will was that pioneered by Libet et al. (1983), which focused on the allegedly unconscious intentions taking place in decisions regarded as free and voluntary. Libet’s interpretation of the so-called readiness potential (RP) seems to favor a sort of deflation of freedom (Soon et al., 2008). However, recent studies seem to point to a different interpretation of the RP, namely that the apparent build-up of the brain activity preceding subjectively spontaneous voluntary movements (SVM) may reflect the ebb and flow of the background neuronal noise, which is triggered by many factors (Schurger et al., 2016). This interpretation seems to bridge the gap between the neuroscientific perspective on free will and the intuitive, commonsensical view of it (Roskies, 2010b), but many problems remain to be solved and other theoretical paths can be hypothesized. The article therefore, proposes to start from an operationalizable concept of free will (Lavazza and Inglese, 2015) to find a connection between higher order descriptions (useful for practical life) and neural bases. This new way to conceptualize free will should be linked to the idea of “capacity”: that is, the availability of a repertoire of general skills that can be manifested and used without moment by moment conscious control. The capacity index, which is also able to take into account the differences of time scales in decisions, includes reasons-responsiveness and is related to internal control, understood as the agent’s ownership of the mechanisms that trigger the relevant behavior. Cognitive abilities, needed for one to have capacity, might be firstly operationalized as a set of neuropsychological tests, which can be used to operationalize and measure specific executive functions, as they are strongly linked to the concept of control. Subsequently, a free will index would allow for the search of the underlying neural correlates of the capacity exhibited by people and the limits in capacity exhibited by each individual.
影响因子：
5.7
作者：
Bode, Stefan;Bogler, Carsten;Haynes, John-Dylan
通讯作者：
Haynes, John-Dylan
影响因子：
2.5
作者：
Shadlen, MN;Newsome, WT
通讯作者：
Newsome, WT