Privacy-Preserving Public Information for Sequential Games
Privacy-Preserving Public Information for Sequential Games
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DOI：
10.1145/2688073.2688100
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发表时间：
2014-02
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Avrim Blum;Jamie Morgenstern;Ankit Sharma;Adam D. Smith
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Avrim Blum;Jamie Morgenstern;Ankit Sharma;Adam D. Smith
在具有不完整信息的设置中，玩家很难协调寻找具有良好社会福利的州。例如，发现最近的金融危机背后的主要原因之一是缺乏市场透明度，这使金融公司难以准确衡量其投资的风险和回报。尽管监管机构可能有权获得公司的投资决策，但直接报告所有公司的行动会引起个人和机构的认真关注。因此，自然的问题是，监管机构是否有可能发布一些信息，这些信息一方面可以帮助金融公司更好地了解其投资的风险，同时保留其投资的隐私决定。更一般地，何时发布有关游戏状态隐私信息的信息何时可以改善社会福利等整体成果？在本文中，我们在一个顺序的资源共享游戏中探讨了这个问题，其中玩家在选择资源方面获得的价值取决于过去选择该资源的其他玩家的数量。如果不了解过去玩家的行动，在这个游戏中获得的社会福利可能是任意的。但是，我们表明，玩家有可能在隐私，公开宣布的信息的帮助下实现良好的社会福利。我们在这种不完美的信息设置中对玩家的行为进行了两种方式 - 贪婪和不主导的战略行为，我们证明了社会福利保证某些类型的隐私信息可以帮助您实现。为了实现社会福利保证，我们设计了一个柜台，并在不断观察的情况下设计了改进的隐私保证。除了资源共享的游戏外，我们还研究其他游戏的主要问题，包括剪切的顺序版本，机器制作和成本分布的游戏以及玩家对特定动作的价值所获得的价值不仅是一个过去玩家的行动的功能，也是未来参与者的行动的功能。
In settings with incomplete information, players can find it difficult to coordinate to find states with good social welfare. For instance, one of the main reasons behind the recent financial crisis was found to be the lack of market transparency, which made it difficult for financial firms to accurately measure the risks and returns of their investments. Although regulators may have access to firms' investment decisions, directly reporting all firms' actions raises confiden- tiality concerns for both individuals and institutions. The natural question, therefore, is whether it is possible for the regulatory agencies to publish some information that, on one hand, helps the financial firms understand the risks of their investments better, and, at the same time, preserves the privacy of their investment decisions. More generally, when can the publication of privacy-preserving information about the state of the game improve overall outcomes such as social welfare? In this paper, we explore this question in a sequential resource-sharing game where the value gained by a player on choosing a resource depends on the number of other players who have chosen that resource in the past. Without any knowledge of the actions of the past players, the social welfare attained in this game can be arbitrarily bad. We show, however, that it is possible for the players to achieve good social welfare with the help of privacy-preserving, publicly-announced information. We model the behavior of players in this imperfect information setting in two ways -- greedy and undominated strategic behaviours, and we prove guarantees about the social welfare that certain kinds of privacy-preserving information can help attain. To achieve the social welfare guarantees, we design a counter with improved privacy guarantees under continual observation. In addition to the resource-sharing game, we study the main question for other games including sequential versions of the cut, machine-scheduling and cost-sharing games, and games where the value attained by a player on a particular action is not only a function of the actions of the past players but also of the actions of the future players.