Overriding consumer preferences with energy regulations
Overriding consumer preferences with energy regulations
复制标题
用能源法规凌驾于消费者偏好之上
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
W. Viscusi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ted Gayer;W. Viscusi
最近颁布和拟议的美国能源法规对灯泡、电器和机动车实施了能源效率标准，这是基于一个未经证实的假设，即消费者和企业是不理性的，能源效率应该是最重要的问题。监管分析没有记录这些所谓的失败，在消费者的选择或公司的能源利用决策与任何经验证据。行政机构声称的法规带来的好处主要来自于消费者和企业因能源成本降低而获得的私人利益。如果没有这些好处，监管成本将大大超过好处。监管分析只考虑将授权作为提高能效的手段，而忽视了其他政策选择。
The recent wave of enacted and proposed U.S. energy regulations imposes energy efficiency standards on light bulbs, appliances, and motor vehicles based on the unsupported assumption that consumers and firms are irrational and that energy efficiency should be the paramount concern. The regulatory analyses do not document these purported failures in consumer choices or firms’ energy utilization decisions with any empirical evidence. The preponderance of the benefits that agencies claim for the regulations is derived from private benefits to consumers and firms attributable to lower energy costs. Without these benefits, the regulatory costs would greatly exceed the benefits. The regulatory analyses consider only mandates as a means of achieving energy-efficiency improvements and ignore other policy options.