Wage Dispersion and Decentralization of Wage Bargaining
Wage Dispersion and Decentralization of Wage Bargaining
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工资分散和工资谈判的分散化
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1466767
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发表时间：
2009
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
J. Munch
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Dahl;Daniel le Maire;J. Munch
本文研究了从部门到企业层面的工资谈判权力下放对工资水平和工资差距的影响。我们使用了详细的面板数据，涵盖了丹麦劳动力市场分散的一段时期。权力下放过程提供了个体工人工资制定制度的变化，这有助于确定权力下放的影响。我们发现，相对于部门层面的讨价还价，企业层面的讨价还价存在工资溢价，而且在更分散的工资制定制度下，技能回报更高。使用分位数回归，我们还发现，与更集中的工资制定制度相比，公司层面的讨价还价制度下的工资更加分散。
This article studies how decentralization of wage bargaining from sector to firm level influences wage levels and wage dispersion. We use detailed panel data covering a period of decentralization in the Danish labor market. The decentralization process provides variation in the individual worker’s wage-setting system that facilitates identification of the effects of decentralization. We find a wage premium associated with firm-level bargaining relative to sector-level bargaining and that the return to skills is higher under the more decentralized wage-setting systems. Using quantile regression, we also find that wages are more dispersed under firm-level bargaining compared to more centralized wage-setting systems.