Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights
Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights
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征用与发明：没有财产权时的适当租金
DOI：
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发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Yao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
James J. Anton;D. Yao
作者分析了一个财务状况不佳的独立发明家在出售一项有价值但很容易被模仿的发明时所面临的问题，但发明没有产权。发明人可以通过在公布发明之前(与买方)协商一份或有合同来保护他或她的知识产权，或者，发明人可以公布发明，然后与新了解情况的买方进行谈判。尽管存在被没收的风险，但作者发现，在均衡情况下，几乎没有财富的发明家可以通过采用后一种方法，从发明的市场价值中侵占相当大的份额。美国经济协会版权所有1994年。
The authors analyze the problem faced by a financially weak independent inventor when selling a valuable, but easily imitated, invention for which no property rights exist. The inventor can protect his or her intellectual property by negotiating a contingent contract (with a buyer) prior to revealing the invention or, alternatively, the inventor can reveal the invention and then negotiate with the newly informed buyer. Despite the risk of expropriation, the authors find that, in equilibrium, an inventor with little wealth can expect to appropriate a sizable share of the market value of the invention by adopting the latter approach. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.