Pseudo-Potential Games ∗
Pseudo-Potential Games ∗
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伪潜力游戏*
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Burkhard C. Schipper
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Burkhard C. Schipper
伪势博弈的概念是由Dubey、Haimanko和Zapechelnyuk（2002）提出的。我们的特点是伪潜在的游戏没有严格的最佳反应周期。与其他类别的潜在的游戏的关系进行了讨论。我们证明了具有策略补充/替代的两人博弈是最佳反应势博弈，因此是伪势博弈。我们为三个玩家提供一个反例。然而，我们展示了为什么具有战略补充/替代和一般行动聚合的n人博弈是伪势博弈。最后，对于可数对策，我们提供了一个简单的方法来构造一个伪势函数。JEL-分类：C72。
The notion of pseudo-potential game is due to Dubey, Haimanko and Zapechelnyuk (2002). We characterize pseudo-potential games by the absence of strict best-response cycles. The relation with other classes of potential games is discussed. We show that two-player games with strategic complements/substitutes are best-response potential games and hence pseudo-potential games. We provide a counter-example for three-players. However, we show why n-player games with strategic complements/substitutes and general aggregation of actions are pseudopotential games. Finally, for countable games we provide a simple method for constructing a pseudo-potential function. JEL-Classifications: C72.