Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium: The Multiple Equilibrium Problem in Mechanism Design
Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium: The Multiple Equilibrium Problem in Mechanism Design
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贝叶斯均衡的实现：机制设计中的多重均衡问题
DOI：
10.1017/ccol0521416663.008
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发表时间：
1990
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Palfrey
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Palfrey
执行理论将社会选择理论和博弈论联系起来。在一个不那么抽象的层面上，它的应用提供了一种基于个人激励的福利经济学方法。实施理论的潜在动机最容易从一个相对不知情的计划者的角度来看，他希望优化社会福利函数，而社会福利函数取决于经济中分散的相关信息的环境参数。因此，计划者希望收集尽可能多的相关信息，并利用这些信息做出社会决策（例如，资源分配）。这是Hurwicz（1972）提出的经典问题。在此后的20年里，我们发现许多研究议程都属于实施问题的一般范畴：对规划程序、合同、最优监管和税收、代理关系、议程和委员会决策、比较选举制度、一般均衡理论的非合作基础的研究，甚至包括会计和法律经济学的许多最新理论工作。
Implementation theory links together social choice theory and game theory. At a less abstract level, its application provides an approach to welfare economics based on individual incentives. The underlying motivation for implementation theory is most easily seen from the point of view of a relatively uninformed planner who wishes to optimize a social welfare function that depends on environmental parameters about which relevant information is scattered around in the economy. Thus, the planner wishes to both collect as much of this relevant information as possible, and, with this information, make a social decision (e.g., an allocation of resources). This is the classic problem identified by Hurwicz (1972). In the twenty years since, we find numerous research agendas falling into the general category of implementation problems: the study of planning procedures, contracts, optimal regulation and taxation, agency relationships, agendas and committee decision-making, comparative electoral systems, non-cooperative foundations of general equilibrium theory, and even much of the recent theoretical work in accounting and the economics of law.