Motivated reasoning and climate change
Motivated reasoning and climate change
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DOI：
10.1016/j.cobeha.2021.02.009
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发表时间：
2021-03-06
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Druckman, James N.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bayes, Robin;Druckman, James N.
尽管科学界达成了强烈的共识，但在美国，对于人类造成的气候变化的信仰和态度仍然存在很大的党派分歧。对这一现象的一个突出的解释是定向的“动机性推理”，在这种推理中，新的信息被处理以达到预先确定的、期望的结论。许多现有工作的理论认为，党派两极分化的发生是因为两个政党的成员正在吸收新信息以实现不同的预期结论，这些结论植根于不同的政党规范、价值观或先前的信仰。然而，最近的工作挑战这个帐户。下一代关于动机性推理和气候变化信念的工作必须通过区分可能驱动动机性推理的不同动机来解决这些挑战，最重要的是，通过确定党派人士何时真正努力达成预期结论，何时努力做到准确。
Despite a strong scientific consensus, there remains a substantial partisan divide in the U.S. regarding belief in, and attitudes toward, human-caused climate change. A preeminent explanation of this phenomenon is directional `motivated reasoning', in which new information is processed in service of reaching a pre-determined, desired conclusion. Much existing work theorizes that partisan polarization occurs because members of the two political parties are assimilating new information to fulfill different desired conclusions, rooted in different party norms, values, or prior standing beliefs. However, recent work challenges this account. The next generation of work on motivated reasoning and climate change beliefs must address these challenges by distinguishing between distinct motivations that may drive motivated reasoning-most significantly, by identifying when partisans are truly striving to reach a desired conclusion and when they are striving to be accurate.