Optimal Advertising for Information Products
Optimal Advertising for Information Products
复制标题
信息产品优化广告
DOI：
10.1145/3465456.3467649
复制
发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Chen, Yiling
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zheng, Shuran;Chen, Yiling
在销售信息产品时，有时销售者可以提供一些免费的部分信息来改变人们的价值，从而有可能增加整体收益。在这项工作中，我们研究的一般问题的广告信息产品通过揭示部分信息。我们认为买家是决策者。决策问题的结果取决于购买者未知的世界状态。购买者可以进行自己的观察，因此可以对世界的状态持有不同的个人信念。有一个信息卖家可以访问世界的状态。卖方可以通过透露部分信息来促进信息。我们假设卖方选择了一个长期的广告策略，然后承诺，买方决定是否购买完整的信息产品后，看到的部分信息。卖方的目标是使预期收益最大化。我们在两种情况下研究这个问题。(1)卖家瞄准的是某种类型的买家。在这种情况下，我们证明了寻找最优广告策略等价于寻找一个简单函数的凹闭包。这个函数是两个量的乘积。第一个是我们所说的似然比，它取决于购买者对世界状况的个人信念。第二个是不确定性成本，它代表了信息对买方的价值。基于这一观察，我们证明了一些性质的最优机制，这使我们能够解决的最优机制，由一个有限大小的凸规划。如果世界的状态有恒定数量的可能实现，或者购买者面临的决策问题有恒定数量的选项，那么凸规划将具有多项式大小。对于一般问题，我们证明了寻找最优机制是NP-困难的。(2)对于一般的问题，当卖方面对不同类型的买家，只知道他们的类型的分布，我们提供了一个近似算法时，它不是太难预测的可能类型的买家谁会购买。对于一般的问题，我们证明了它是NP-难找到一个常数因子近似。
When selling information products, sometimes the seller can provide some free partial information to change people's valuations so that the overall revenue can possibly be increased. In this work, we study the general problem of advertising information products by revealing partial information. We consider buyers who are decision-makers. The outcomes of the decision problems depend on the state of the world that is unknown to the buyers. The buyers can make their own observations and thus can hold different personal beliefs about the state of the world. There is an information seller who has access to the state of the world. The seller can promote the information by revealing some partial information. We assume that the seller chooses a long-term advertising strategy and then commits to it. The buyers decide whether to purchase the full information product after seeing the partial information. The seller's goal is to maximize the expected revenue. We study the problem in two settings. (1) The seller targets buyers of a certain type. In this case, we prove that finding the optimal advertising strategy is equivalent to finding the concave closure of a simple function. The function is a product of two quantities. The first one is what we call the likelihood ratio, which depends on the buyer's personal belief about the state of the world. The second one is the cost of uncertainty, which represents the value of the information to the buyer. Based on this observation, we prove some properties of the optimal mechanism, which allow us to solve for the optimal mechanism by a finite-size convex program. The convex program will have a polynomial size if the state of the world has a constant number of possible realizations or the buyers face a decision problem with a constant number of options. For the general problem, we prove that it is NP-hard to find the optimal mechanism. (2) For the general problem when the seller faces buyers of different types and only knows the distribution of their types, we provide an approximation algorithm when it is not too hard to predict the possible type of buyers who will make the purchase. For the general problem, we prove that it is NP-hard to find a constant-factor approximation.
登录
查看更多内容
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3145000
发表时间：
2017-02
期刊：
ERN: Information Asymmetry Models (Topic)
影响因子：
--
作者：
D. Bergemann;S. Morris
通讯作者：
D. Bergemann;S. Morris
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
M. Sarvary
通讯作者：
M. Sarvary
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
SeCO Workshops
影响因子：
--
作者：
S. Dughmi
通讯作者：
S. Dughmi
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
2020.
影响因子：
--
作者：
Yiling Chen, Haifeng Xu
通讯作者：
Yiling Chen, Haifeng Xu
混合物选择、机制设计和信号传导
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2015
期刊：
IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
影响因子：
--
作者：
Yu Cheng;Ho Yee Cheung;S. Dughmi;E. Emamjomeh;Lining Han;S. Teng
通讯作者：
S. Teng