Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict
Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict
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领土牵制：战争与领土冲突的牵制理论
DOI：
10.1017/s0022381609990879
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Tir
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Tir
根据战争转移理论，不受欢迎的领导人制造外交政策危机，既转移公众对他们统治不满的注意力，又通过围绕旗帜效应的集会来巩固他们的政治命运。我认为，令人困惑的缺乏明确的实证支持的理论可能是由于不够规范的理论机制，通过公众反应的特定问题的中心转移的“危机”。由于人们往往对领土问题反应激烈，四面楚歌的领导人可能会试图通过发动领土冲突来操纵和利用这种倾向。通过将政府不受欢迎与全球国家样本中军事化领土冲突和危机的启动联系起来，这种领土转移论点得到了强有力的经验支持。此外，引发致命的军事化领土争端也与经济表现不佳有关。
According to the diversionary theory of war, unpopular leaders generate foreign policy crises to both divert the public’s attention away from the discontent with their rule and bolster their political fortunes through a rally around the flag effect. I argue that the puzzling lack of clear empirical support for the theory may be due to the underspecification of the theoretical mechanism through which the public reacts to the particular issue at the center of the diversionary “crisis.” Because people tend to react to territorial issues intensely, the embattled leader could attempt to manipulate and exploit this proclivity by launching specifically a territorial conflict. By linking government unpopularity with the initiation of militarized territorial conflicts and crises in a global sample of countries, this territorial diversion argument receives strong empirical support. The initiation of fatal militarized disputes over territory is, in addition, linked to economic underperformance.