To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That is the Question
To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That is the Question
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发表时间：
1988-05
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通讯作者：
Harvey E. Lapan;T. Sandler
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作者：
Harvey E. Lapan;T. Sandler
1986年11月，新闻媒体披露，里根政府在通过武器交易换取三名美国人的自由时，严重偏离了其绝不与恐怖分子谈判的既定政策。本杰明·威尔（Benjamin Weir）于1985年9月，牧师劳伦斯·詹科（Rev. Lawrence Jenco）于1986年11月，大卫·雅各布森（David Jacobsen）于1986年11月。1987年1月26日，恐怖分子冒充警察绑架了贝鲁特美国大学的一名印度人和三名美国教授，从而取代了之前被交换的三名美国人。几乎每天都能在新闻广播中听到的公认智慧认为，人们永远不应该与恐怖分子讨价还价，因为此类谈判使其成为一项有利可图的活动，从而鼓励更多的劫持人质；贝鲁特最近发生的事件似乎支持传统观点。然而，即使是预先承诺不谈判战略的最坚定支持者以色列，在 1974 年 5 月在马洛特被扣为人质的学童事件以及 1985 年 6 月环球航空公司 847 航班劫持事件中也做出了值得注意的例外。另一个例外是以色列在 5 月份通过谈判交换了三名以色列士兵，释放了 1,150 名阿拉伯囚犯，其中包括 Kozo Okomato。 1985 年（《经济学人》，1987 年，第 29 页）。日本红军派成员大驹是1972年罗德机场大屠杀中唯一幸存的恐怖分子，该事件造成27人死亡、78人受伤。我们在简单的博弈论框架中使用经济分析来确定政府在什么情况下愿意预先承诺采取不谈判策略。从政府的角度来看，我们研究了威慑支出的选择（即旨在减少事件期间恐怖分子后勤成功的支出）以及是否进行谈判。我们的分析表明，恐怖分子的信念和决心对于确定在可信的预先承诺的情况下需要采取不谈判策略的相当限制性的情景至关重要。2当政府声明不完全可信，并且政府不谈判的成本具有不确定性时，那么从不谈判可能会在时间上不一致，也不是一个合理的政策。在多时期模型中，出于公共选择的考虑，声誉效应可能不足以让政府维持不与劫持人质恐怖分子进行谈判的政策。也许令人惊讶的是，除了少数人为的案例之外，关于不谈判策略的传统智慧经不起理论审查。
In November 1986, news media revelations disclosed that the Reagan Administration had deviated significantly from its stated policy of never negotiating with terrorists when it traded arms to obtain the freedom of three Americans-Rev. Benjamin Weir in September 1985, Rev. Lawrence Jenco in July 1986, and David Jacobsen in November 1986. On January 26, 1987, terrorists, posing as policemen, kidnapped an Indian and three American professors at the American University of Beirut, thereby replacing the three Americans previously bartered away. Accepted wisdom, heard almost daily in newscasts, maintains that one should never bargain with terrorists since such negotiations encourage more hostage taking by making it a profitable activity; recent events in Beirut seem to support conventional views. Yet even the staunchest supporter of the no-negotiation strategy of precommitment, the Israelis, has made noteworthy exceptions in the case of the school children taken hostage at Maalot in May 1974,' and during the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in June 1985. Another exception involved the Israelis' release of 1,150 Arab prisoners, including Kozo Okomato, in a negotiated swap for three Israeli soldiers in May 1985 (The Economist, 1987, p. 29). Okomato, a Japanese Red Army Faction member, was the sole surviving terrorist in the Lod Airport massacre of 1972, which left 27 people dead and 78 injured. We use economic analysis in a simple game-theory framework to ascertain under what circumstances a government would want to precommit itself to a no-negotiation strategy. From the government viewpoint, we examine both the choice of deterrence expenditure (i.e., expense meant to reduce terrorist logistical success during incidents) and whether to negotiate or not. Our analysis demonstrates that the beliefs and the resolve of the terrorists are crucial in identifying the rather restrictive scenarios in which a no-negotiation strategy is desirable in the case of a credible precommitment.2 When governmental declarations are not completely credible and uncertainty characterizes the government's costs of not negotiating, then never negotiating is likely to be time inconsistent and not a plausible policy. In a multiperiod model, reputation effects may not be sufficient for a government to maintain a policy of never negotiating with hostage-taking terrorists owing to public choice considerations. Perhaps surprising, the conventional wisdom regarding the nonegotiation strategy does not withstand theoretical scrutiny except in a limited number of contrived cases.