Risk as Feelings
Risk as Feelings
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DOI：
10.1037/0033-2909.127.2.267
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发表时间：
2001-02
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
George Loewenstein;Elke U. Weber;Christopher K. Hsee
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
George Loewenstein;Elke U. Weber;Christopher K. Hsee
实际上，当前所有关于风险或不确定性下的选择理论都是认知性的和结果主义的。它们假定人们会评估选择方案可能结果的可取性和可能性，并通过某种基于期望的计算方法整合这些信息以做出决策。作者提出了一种替代性的理论视角，即风险即情感假说，该假说强调了决策时刻所体验到的情感的作用。通过借鉴临床、生理以及心理学其他子领域的研究，他们表明对风险情境的情绪反应往往与对这些风险的认知评估不一致。当这种不一致发生时，情绪反应往往会驱动行为。风险即情感假说被证明可以解释一系列用认知 - 结果主义术语难以解释的现象。
Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological, and other subfields of psychology, they show that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is shown to explain a wide range of phenomena that have resisted interpretation in cognitive-consequentialist terms.