Causes, contrasts, and the non-identity problem
Causes, contrasts, and the non-identity problem
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原因、对比和非同一性问题
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
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通讯作者：
T. Bontly
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Bontly
一个行为是否会伤害某个人——一个未来的人，一个尚不存在但将会存在的人——如果这个人如果没有那个行为就永远不会存在？这是非同一性问题提出的一个问题。许多人会认为答案是否定的：一种行为只会伤害某人，因为它对她来说更糟，而如果没有该行为，她就不会存在，那么这种行为对她来说就不会更糟。本文的第一部分认为，“无害”论点的合理性源于模棱两可。后半部分主张对伤害进行因果和对比的解释。最后，本文认为，对比解释消除了无害论点，并进一步消除了相关论点（利益论点），该论点对于先前提出的一些非同一性问题的解决方案来说是有问题的。
Can an act harm someone—a future someone, someone who does not exist yet but will—if that person would never exist but for that very action? This is one question raised by the non-identity problem. Many would argue that the answer is No: an action harms someone only insofar as it is worse for her, and an action cannot be worse for someone if she would not exist without it. The first part of this paper contends that the plausibility of the ‘no harm’ argument stems from an equivocation. The second half argues for an account of harm that is both causal and contrastive. Finally, the paper contends that the contrastive account disarms the no harm argument and furthermore neutralizes a related argument (the benefit argument) that has been problematic for some previously proposed solutions to the non-identity problem.