Optimal Policy and the Role of Social Contacts in a Search Model with Heterogeneous Workers
Optimal Policy and the Role of Social Contacts in a Search Model with Heterogeneous Workers
复制标题
最优政策和社会接触在异质工人搜索模型中的作用
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2326911
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Zaharieva
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yuliia Stupnytska;A. Zaharieva
本文提出了一种具有异质工作者和社会网络的搜索模型。高能力员工的工作效率更高，拥有更多的专业联系。企业可以在正规劳动力市场的高成本职位空缺和转介市场的低成本职位空缺之间做出选择。在这种情况下，该模型预测，社会联系的数量越多，高技能和低技能工人之间的工资差距就越大，均衡失业率的差异就越大。接下来，我们证明了分散均衡对于任何讨价还价能力的价值都是无效的。效率低下的原因有两个。首先，在推荐市场上创造就业机会的私人收益总是低于社会收益，因此高技能工人的均衡失业高于其最佳值。此外，高技能工人挤占了低技能工人的市场，因此均衡工资不平等低效率地很大。这与Blazquez和Jansen(2008)的结果形成了鲜明对比，该结果表明，工资分布在具有异质工人的搜索模型中是压缩的。最后，我们证明了税收和补贴相结合可以恢复最优配置。
This paper develops a search model with heterogeneous workers and social networks. High ability workers are more productive and have a larger number of professional contacts. Firms have a choice between a high cost vacancy in the regular labour market and a low cost job opening in the referral market. In this setting the model predicts that a larger number of social contacts is associated with a larger wage gap between high and low ability workers and a larger difference in the equilibrium unemployment rates. Next we demonstrate that the decentralized equilibrium is inefficient for any value of the bargaining power. There are two reasons for the inefficiency. First, the private gain from creating a job in the referral market is always below the social gain, so the equilibrium unemployment of high ability workers is above its optimal value. Moreover, high ability workers congest the market for low ability workers, so the equilibrium wage inequality is inefficiently large. This is in contrast to the result of Blazquez and Jansen (2008) showing that the distribution of wages is compressed in a search model with heterogeneous workers. Finally, we show that a combination of taxes and subsidies can restore the optimal allocation.
影响因子：
2.4
作者：
Glitz, Albrecht
通讯作者：
Glitz, Albrecht