Corruption and Voter Participation
Corruption and Voter Participation
复制标题
腐败与选民参与
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
W. Shughart
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Monica P. Escaleras;Peter T. Calcagno;W. Shughart
关于选民投票率的文献集中在选民投票供应的决定因素上。然而，人们越来越认识到，选票的需求者--候选人、政党和利益集团--有强烈的动机在选举日投入资源动员支持。作者检验了这样一个假设，即腐败租金增加了担任公职的价值，因此，在建立获胜联盟方面引起了更大的需求方努力。分析了1979年至2005年期间因滥用职权而被定罪的公职人员的汇总时间序列数据集，我们发现，在控制了其他影响因素后，政府腐败提高了州长选举的投票率。
The literature on voter turnout focuses on the determinants of the electorate’s vote supply. There is growing recognition, however, that the demanders of votes—candidates, political parties, and interest groups—have strong incentives to invest resources in mobilizing support on Election Day. The authors test the hypothesis that corruption rents increase the value of holding public office and, hence, elicit greater demand-side effort in building winning coalitions. Analyzing a pooled time-series data set of public officials convicted of misusing their offices between 1979 and 2005, we find, after controlling for other influential factors, that governmental corruption raises voter turnout rates in gubernatorial elections.