Banks and Cross-Border Capital Flows: Policy Challenges and Regulatory Responses Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform
Banks and Cross-Border Capital Flows: Policy Challenges and Regulatory Responses Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform
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银行与跨境资本流动：政策挑战与监管应对 国际经济政策与改革委员会
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
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通讯作者：
Yongding Yu
中科院分区：
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作者：
Markus K. Brunnermeier;J. Gregorio;Barry Eichengreen;M. El;A. Fraga;Takatoshi Ito;P. Lane;J. Pisani;E. Prasad;R. Rajan;Maria Ramos;Hélène Rey;D. Rodrik;Kenneth Rogoff;H. Shin;A. Velasco;B. W. D. Mauro;Yongding Yu
国际经济政策和改革委员会是一个无党派的独立专家小组，由学者和前政府和中央银行官员组成。其目标是分析全球货币和金融问题，提供系统分析，并提出改革思路。委员会试图确定应加强全球经济结构的领域，并提出旨在调和国家利益与更广泛的全球利益的解决办法。通过其报告，它力求促进公众对全球经济管理和经济治理中的关键问题的了解。委员会的每一份报告都将侧重于一个具体的专题，并将强调长期而不是临时性的政策问题。委员会感谢阿尔弗雷德·P·斯隆基金会 * 提供财政支持，并感谢布鲁金斯学会主办委员会并为其工作提供便利。Quynh Tonnu向委员会提供了出色的行政和后勤支助。* 布鲁金斯认识到，它提供给任何捐助者的价值在于它对质量、独立性和影响力的绝对承诺。由捐助者赞助的活动反映了这一承诺，研究议程、内容和结果都不受任何捐助的影响。在我们的上一份报告《反思中央银行业务》中，我们提出了扩大中央银行和货币政策协调任务的理由。在本报告中，我们为跨境银行流动和改善监管协调制定了一个补充框架。开放资本账户的传统政策处方是，通过逐一消除阻碍资本自由流动的障碍，可以获得资本流动的好处。考虑到新兴经济体和发展中经济体体制薄弱，它们的自由化速度较慢。然而，最近的经验，如欧洲的资本流动逆转，表明如果资本流动固有的顺周期性得不到充分解决，即使是发达经济体也可能容易受到资本账户自由化的意外后果的影响。资本流动的顺周期性原则上可以通过协调一致的全球监管和全球协调一致的货币政策来解决。然而，在实践中，这种协调的设计或执行并不简单，即使各国的利益重叠或一致。即使在全球最佳协调情况下，也可能与国家治理的宝贵特权产生紧张关系。考虑到全球协调的障碍，各国可能别无选择，只能设计框架，以减轻跨境流动的风险。
III Preface T he Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform is a non-partisan, independent group of experts, comprised of academics and former government and central bank officials. Its objective is to analyze global monetary and financial problems, offer systematic analysis, and advance reform ideas. The Committee attempts to identify areas in which the global economic architecture should be strengthened and recommend solutions intended to reconcile national interests with broader global interests. Through its reports, it seeks to foster public understanding of key issues in global economic management and economic governance. Each Committee report will focus on a specific topic and will emphasize longer-term rather than conjunctural policy issues. The Committee is grateful to the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation* for providing financial support and to the Brookings Institution for hosting the committee and facilitating its work. Quynh Tonnu provided excellent administrative and logistical support to the Committee. *Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any donor is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence and impact. Activities sponsored by its donors reflect this commitment and neither the research agenda, content, nor outcomes are influenced by any donation. Iv I n our previous report, Rethinking Central Banking , we made the case for a broader mandate for central banks and for monetary policy coordination. In this report, we lay out a complementary framework for cross-border banking flows and for improved regulatory coordination. The traditional policy prescription for capital account opening is that the benefits of capital flows can be reaped by removing the impediments to unfettered capital movements one by one. Some allowance is made for emerging and developing economies to liberalize more slowly, given their weak institutions. However recent experience, such as the capital flow reversals in Europe, has shown that even advanced economies may be vulnerable to the unintended consequences of capital account liberalization when the procyclicality inherent in capital flows is not adequately addressed. The procyclicality of capital flows can in principle be addressed through coordinated global regulation and globally coordinated monetary policy. However, in practice such coordination is not straightforward to design or implement, even when the interests of countries overlap or are congruent. And even when coordination is globally optimal, it may generate tensions with the valued prerogative of national governance. Given the obstacles to global coordination, countries may have little choice but to design frameworks that mitigate the risks of cross-border flows at the …