Scanlon on Substantive Responsibility
Scanlon on Substantive Responsibility
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斯坎伦论实质性责任
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Alex Voorhoeve
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Alex Voorhoeve
本文考察了一个人的选择机会在社会安排的正当性中所起的作用。共同判断为这些机会提供了一个合理的角色：例如，它认为，我们应该通过适当选择来优先预防人们无法避免的伤害，而不是预防他们可以避免的伤害。托马斯·斯坎伦（Thomas Scanlon）认为，这种判断应该参照一个人的选择机会的价值来解释：如果一个人被赋予的机会通常会导致人们避免所讨论的伤害，那么，斯坎伦认为，这就使得她不能抱怨自己选择的结果。我认为，尽管斯坎伦关注一个人机会的价值是正确的，但他确定机会价值的方式是有缺陷的。相反，我认为，我们应该评估一个人的机会集，考虑她在这个机会集中进行选择所能获得的各种结果，以及考虑到她的选择倾向，她在多大程度上处于有利的位置，以实现好的结果，避免坏的结果。我认为，这种观点可以解释为什么我们应该优先考虑预防人们无法避免的伤害，选择适当的方式，而不是预防他们可以避免的伤害。我还认为，它可以解释保护人们免受可能受到伤害的选择的重要性。
This paper examines the role of a person’s opportunities to choose in the justification of social arrangements. Common judgment gives these opportunities a justificatory role: it holds, for example, that we should prioritise preventing harm that people cannot avoid by choosing appropriately over preventing harm that they can so avoid. Thomas Scanlon argues that such judgments should be explained with reference to the value of a person’s opportunities to choose: if a person is given opportunities which generally lead people to avoid the harm in question, then, Scanlon argues, this can make it the case that she cannot complain about what results from her choices. I argue that while Scanlon is right to focus on the value of a person’s opportunities, his way of determining their value is flawed. Instead, I argue, we should evaluate a person’s opportunity set by taking account of the various outcomes that she can achieve by choosing from this set and how well placed she is, given her dispositions to choose, to achieve the good and avoid the bad outcomes. I argue that this view can explain why we should prioritise preventing harm that people cannot avoid by choosing appropriately over preventing harm that they can so avoid. I also argue that it can account for the importance of protecting people against choices through which they might come to harm.