A Methodological Note on a Weighted Voting Experiment

A Methodological Note on a Weighted Voting Experiment
复制标题

关于加权投票实验的方法说明

DOI:
10.1007/s00355-014-0814-y
复制
发表时间:
2014
影响因子:
0.9
通讯作者:
Xiaoyan Lu
Xiaoyan Lu
中科院分区:
经济学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Eric Grauci;Nobuyuki Hanaki;Naoki Watanabe;Gabriele Exposito;Xiaoyan Lu

文献摘要

相似文献

我们通过改变蒙特罗等人的实验方案的两个特征,对加权投票实验的结果进行了敏感性分析。(Soc Choice Welf 30(1):69-87,2008):(1)在每一轮中重新分配主体角色的方式[随机角色(RR)与固定角色(FR)]和(2)主体可以同时批准的提案数量[多次批准(MA)] vs.单一批准(SA)]。据观察,这些协议中的差异对最低获胜联盟的相对频率以及谈判如何进行产生了影响。3-与RR和MA相比,FR和SA协议更频繁地观察到玩家MWC,谈判时间更长,受试者犯错误更少,并且更频繁地观察到提议-反对动态。
We conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results of weighted voting experiments by varying two features of the experimental protocol by Montero et al. (Soc Choice Welf 30(1):69–87, 2008): (1) the way in which the roles of subjects are reassigned in each round [random role (RR) vs. fixed role (FR)] and (2) the number of proposals that subjects can simultaneously approve [multiple approval (MA) vs. single approval (SA)]. It was observed that the differences in these protocols had impacts on the relative frequencies of minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) as well as how negotiations proceed. 3-player MWCs were more frequently observed, negotiations were much longer, subjects made less mistakes, and proposal-objection dynamics were more frequently observed, under the protocol with FR and SA than under the protocol with RR and MA.