Mental Activity & the Sense of Ownership
Mental Activity & the Sense of Ownership
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DOI：
10.1007/s13164-014-0208-1
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发表时间：
2015-12-01
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Alsmith, Adrian
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Alsmith, Adrian
我介绍并捍卫所有权感的认知解释的概念。对所有权感的一种认知解释认为，只有当一个人认为某物是自己的时，一个人才会体验到某物是自己的。相比之下，对所有权感的一种现象性解释认为，一个人可以将某些东西体验为自己的，而不需要将任何东西视为自己的。我认为，我们没有理由偏爱现象描述而不是认知描述，认知描述是合理的，因为我们的许多心理活动对我们的心理生活都有未被注意到的影响，并且有时被描述为独立于思想的身体所有权的某些虚幻体验可能最好解释为富有想象力的感知体验。
I introduce and defend the notion of a cognitive account of the sense of ownership. A cognitive account of the sense of ownership holds that one experiences something as one's own only if one thinks of something as one's own. By contrast, a phenomenal account of the sense of ownership holds that one can experience something as one's own without thinking about anything as one's own. I argue that we have no reason to favour phenomenal accounts over cognitive accounts, that cognitive accounts are plausible given that much of our mental activity has unnoticed effects on our mental life, and that certain illusory experiences of body ownership sometimes described as thought-independent may be best explained as imaginative perceptual experiences.