Experience Information Goods: 'Version-to-Upgrade'
Experience Information Goods: 'Version-to-Upgrade'
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1960029
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发表时间：
2012-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Xueqi Wei;B. R. Nault
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Xueqi Wei;B. R. Nault
与“搜索商品”的真实质量可以在检查之前确定不同，我们检查的是“经验商品”的信息商品--其真实质量只能通过使用来确定。我们分析了一个“版本升级”的策略，垄断者产生垂直差异化的版本作为桥梁，导致消费者体验的商品，使他们能够评估他们的真实质量，然后提供升级到最初购买质量较低的版本的消费者。采用两阶段模型，我们发现，如果消费者在体验之前对质量有同质的期望，那么版本升级策略涉及升级所有在第一阶段购买低质量版本的消费者。通过这种方式，升级的消费者实际上为学习支付了一笔税。当消费者对体验前的质量有异质期望时，如果消费者悲观，那么版本升级策略仍然会驱动所有消费者升级。然而，如果消费者持乐观态度，那么版本升级策略可能只会导致部分最初购买低质量版本的消费者升级。随着升级带来的利润增加，垄断者将低质量版本的质量设置为能够切实揭示真实质量的最低质量，从而证明使用试用或演示版本是合理的。
In contrast to "search goods" whose true quality can be determined before inspection, we examine information goods that are "experience goods" - goods whose true quality can only be determined through use. We analyze a "version-to-upgrade" strategy where a monopolist generates vertically differentiated versions as bridges that lead consumers to experience the goods so that they can assess their true quality, and then provide upgrades to consumers that initially purchase lower quality versions. Adopting a two-stage model, we find that if consumers have homogeneous expectations about quality before experience, then the version-to-upgrade strategy involves upgrading all the consumers that in the first stage purchased the low quality version. In this way, consumers that upgrade effectively pay a tax for learning. When consumers have heterogeneous expectations about quality before experience, if consumers are pessimistic, then the version-to-upgrade strategy still drives all consumers to upgrade. However, if consumers are optimistic, then, the version-to-upgrade strategy may induce only some of the consumers that initially purchased the low quality version to upgrade. As profits from upgrades increase, the monopolist sets the quality of the low quality version to the lowest quality that can feasibly reveal the true quality, justifying the use of trial or demonstration versions.