A Random-Sampling Double-Auction Mechanism
A Random-Sampling Double-Auction Mechanism
复制标题
一种随机抽样的双重拍卖机制
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Y. Aumann
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Erel Segal;Avinatan Hassidim;Y. Aumann
我们提出了一种多物品双向拍卖的机制。我们考虑三种不同的设置。(1)只有一个项目类型。每个卖家持有该物品的几个单位，每个买家可能想要几个单位的该物品。买家和卖家的边际收益是恒定的或递减的。(2)项目类型多样。每个卖家持有几个预先指定类型的单位，而买家是单位需求。(3)题型多样。每个卖家持有几个预先指定类型的单位，买家拥有总替代估值。这种机制是随机抽样和随机序列独裁的结合。它是一种事前自由、普遍的个人理性、主导战略、诚实和强烈的预算平衡。当所有商品类型的市场足够大时，它的市场交易收益接近最优。Ccs概念：r计算理论，→计算定价和拍卖；素描和抽样；
We present a mechanism for double auction of multiple items. We consider three different settings. (1) There is one item-type. Each seller holds several units of that item and each buyer may want several units of that item. Buyers and sellers have constant or decreasing marginal returns. (2) There are multiple item-types. Each seller holds several units of a pre-specified type and the buyers are unit-demand. (3) There are multiple item-types. Each seller holds several units of a pre-specified type and the buyers have gross-substitute valuations. The mechanism is a combination of random-sampling and random-serial-dictatorship. It is prior-free, universally individuallyrational, dominant-strategy truthful and strongly budget-balanced. Its market-gain-from-trade approaches the optimum when the market in all item types is sufficiently large. CCS Concepts: rTheory of computation→ Computational pricing and auctions; Sketching and sampling;