Endogenous capital supply and equilibrium leadership in tax competition
Endogenous capital supply and equilibrium leadership in tax competition
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DOI：
10.1016/j.iref.2020.06.031
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发表时间：
2020-11
影响因子：
4.5
通讯作者：
Keisuke Kawachi;Hikaru Ogawa;Taiki Susa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Keisuke Kawachi;Hikaru Ogawa;Taiki Susa
在本文中，我们重新考虑税收竞争的领导，重点放在一个情况下，国家竞争的资本总量是内生决定的。具体来说，我们建立了一个不对称税收竞争下的时间博弈模型，在这个模型中，资本不仅由两国的居民提供，而且还由这些国家以外的投资者提供。结果表明，当资本市场对外部投资者来说变得更容易进入时，更有可能实现顺序移动均衡，即一个国家领先，另一个国家跟随。相反，只有当市场的开放程度足够小时，才会出现一个错误移动均衡。当政府在公共投资而不是税收方面竞争时，这些结果就会逆转。
In this paper, we reconsider the leadership of tax competition, focusing on a situation where total amount of capital competed by countries is endogenously determined. Specifically, we model a timing game under asymmetric tax competition, in which capital is supplied not only by the residents of two countries, but also by investors outside these countries. The results show that, when the capital market becomes more accessible for outside investors, sequential-move equilibria are more likely to be realized, in which one country leads and the other follows. Conversely, only a simultaneous-move equilibrium emerges when the openness of the market is sufficiently small. These results are reversed when governments compete in public investment rather than tax.