Leverage and the Complexity of Takeovers
Leverage and the Complexity of Takeovers
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杠杆和收购的复杂性
DOI：
10.1111/j.0732-8516.2005.00094.x
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Makhija
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tomas Jandik;A. Makhija
尽管文献中有几个被广泛引用的经济学理论，但关于目标公司的杠杆如何影响其股东收益的实证证据很少。有限的现有证据表明，杠杆率较高的目标公司的股东获得了更高的回报。然而，即使是这种观察到的债务对收购的影响，也不能与仅仅机械的“纯杠杆效应”区分开来，这让经济学解释未经检验。因此，我们在这里采用了另一种方法来检验收购目标的债务是否在收购中真的很重要。我们报告称，涉及杠杆率较高的目标的收购过程在几个方面往往要复杂得多。我们发现，这类收购往往需要更长的时间来消费，更有可能与多个竞标者拍卖相关，并且在报价上经历更大的修正。最后，我们发现，使收购变得更加复杂的因素也会导致更大的目标收益。版权所有：东方金融协会2005年。
There is scant empirical evidence on how the leverage of target firms affects gains to their shareholders, although there are several widely cited economic theories offered in the literature. The limited available evidence shows that shareholders of targets with greater leverage experience higher returns. However, even this observed effect of debt on takeovers cannot be distinguished from a mere mechanical "pure leveraging effect", leaving the economic explanations untested. Consequently, we adopt an alternative approach here to examine if targets' debt truly matters in takeovers. We report that acquisition processes involving targets with higher leverage tend to be significantly more complex in several ways. We find that such acquisitions tend to take a longer time to consume, are more likely to be associated with multiple bidder auctions, and experience greater revisions in offer prices. Finally, we find that factors that make takeovers more complex also lead to greater target gains. Copyright 2005 by the Eastern Finance Association.
影响因子：
8
作者：
S. Titman;R. Wessels
通讯作者：
S. Titman;R. Wessels