Bargaining in a Long-Term Relationship with Endogenous Termination
Bargaining in a Long-Term Relationship with Endogenous Termination
复制标题
与内源性终止的长期关系中的讨价还价
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1057
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发表时间：
1995
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
A. Muthoo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Muthoo
本文研究了一个完全信息动态博弈，其中两个博弈者每次就一块新蛋糕的分割达成协议，就开始讨价还价。根据鲁宾斯坦的交替提供模型，就每块蛋糕的分割进行谈判。模型的参数是玩家的时间偏好率，两个连续报价之间的时间间隔，以及一套谈判结束和下一套谈判开始之间的滞后时间。我们刻画了唯一的平稳完美均衡，并研究了非平稳均衡的可能存在。经济文献分类编号：C73，C78。
Abstract This paper studies a dynamic game of perfect information, in which two players start bargaining over the partition of a new cake each time agreement is struck over the partition of an existing cake. Negotiations over the partition of each cake take place according to Rubinstein′s alternating-offers model. The parameters of the model are the players′ rates of time preference, the time interval between two consecutive offers, and the lag time between the end of one set of negotiations and the start of the next. We characterize the unique stationary perfect equilibrium and investigate the possible existence of non-stationary equilibria. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, C78.