Too Busy to Serve? An Examination of the Influence of Overboarded Directors
Too Busy to Serve? An Examination of the Influence of Overboarded Directors
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太忙而无法提供服务？
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00453.x
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
K. Shimizu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
I. C. Harris;K. Shimizu
overboard董事（即在多个董事会任职的董事）最近受到了攻击。有人指责说，这些董事被多个董事职位“拉扯”，因此无法履行其治理责任。本研究探讨了过多董事对公司收购等关键战略决策的影响。通过对并购结果的考察，我们发现这类董事是知识的重要来源，能够提高并购绩效。此外，他们是对内部董事和非超额董事的重要补充。版权所有布莱克威尔出版有限公司2004。
Overboarded directors (i.e., those serving on too many boards) have come under recent attack. The accusation is that such directors are 'stretched' by several directorships and therefore cannot fulfil their governance responsibility. This study investigates the impact of overboarded directors upon key strategic decisions such as corporate acquisitions. Based on our examination of acquisition outcomes, we found that such directors are important sources of knowledge and enhance acquisition performance. Moreover, they represent an important complement to inside and non-overboarded outside directors. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004.