A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Business Cycles and Price Wars During Booms
A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Business Cycles and Price Wars During Booms
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繁荣时期商业周期和价格战的超级博弈论模型
DOI：
10.3386/w1412
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发表时间：
1984
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Garth Saloner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Rotemberg;Garth Saloner
本文研究了面对波动需求的隐式串通寡头垄断行为。未来惩罚的可信威胁提供了促进串通的纪律。然而，我们发现，当需求旺盛时，单方面摆脱串通结果的诱惑往往更大。为了缓和这种诱惑，优化的寡头垄断在这种时候降低了它的盈利能力，导致了更低的价格。如果寡头垄断企业的产出是对其他部门的投入，那么他们的产出可能也会增加。这解释了作为商业周期特征的产出的共同变动。19世纪80年代S时期的铁路行为、50年代S时期的汽车工业以及水泥价格和价格成本边际的周期性行为支持了我们的理论。(J.E.L.船级号：020,130,610)
This paper studies implicitly colluding oligopolists facing fluctuating demand. The credible threat of future punishments provides the discipline that facilitates collusion. However, we find that the temptation to unilaterally deflate from the collusive outcome is often greater when demand is high. To moderate this temptation,the optimizing oligopoly reduces its profitability at such times,resulting in lower prices. If the oligopolists' output is an input to other sectors, their output may increase too. This explains the co-movements of outputs which characterize business cycles. The behavior of the railroads in the 1880's, the automobile industry in the 1950's and the cyclical behavior of cement prices and price-cost margins support our theory. (J.E.L. Classification numbers:020, 130, 610).