Revealing transactions data to third parties: Implications of privacy regimes for welfare in online markets
Revealing transactions data to third parties: Implications of privacy regimes for welfare in online markets
复制标题
向第三方披露交易数据：隐私制度对在线市场福利的影响
DOI：
10.1111/jems.12337
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
D. E. Sappington
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Baye;D. E. Sappington
我们研究隐私政策对交易的影响（例如，价格/数量）数据。交易数据的披露会导致消费者的信号行为，从而影响商家的定价决策和平台参与者的福利。利润最大化的平台更喜欢使总福利最大化的披露政策。虽然这项政策有利于成熟的消费者，但它伤害了不成熟（近视）的消费者。因此，替代隐私政策、数据泄露、欺骗性隐私政策和选择加入/选择退出要求的福利效应可能会有很大差异，这取决于消费者的成熟程度和其他因素，如当前的现状。
We examine the effects of privacy policies regarding transactions (e.g., price/quantity) data on online shopping platforms. Disclosure of transactions data induces consumer signaling behavior that affects merchant pricing decisions and the welfare of platform participants. A profit‐maximizing platform prefers the disclosure policy that maximizes total welfare. Although this policy benefits sophisticated consumers, it harms unsophisticated (myopic) consumers. Consequently, the welfare effects of alternative privacy policies, data breaches, deceptive privacy policies, and opt‐in/opt‐out requirements can differ sharply, depending on the level of consumer sophistication and on other factors such as the prevailing status quo.